Online Sociology Courses

Another consequence of the above is that survey research measures variables, not whole persons, social structures, or cultural systems. It slices and dices reality into variables that can be correlated with each other; while it is important to measure the variable (or changing properties) of the social universe, variable analysis chops up reality in ways that are not amenable to theory testing. As noted above, the measure of social structure is self-reported on a questionnaire that uses an SES index; the measure of behavior is often what people say they do; the measure of cultural beliefs are a few items on a scale that has been factor analyzed (only aggravating the problem of chopping up reality in the interests of data collection). I am not saying that surveys are useless in theory-testing, because a theory may include cognitive dynamics that can be conveniently measured by a well-thought-out questionnaire. Yet, variable analysis typically breaks apart reality for the convenience of researchers and computerdriven statistical packages, and as it does so, it distorts reality. The end result is that it cannot test social processes and dynamics outlined in a theory.
Let’s face it. Survey research is performed because it is comparatively cheap (especially in the time needed to conduct the research), and it can lead to quick publications that are essential to success in an academic career. With the advent of statistical packages and the ability to run these on data sets on personal computers, this kind of research is made even easier. It is hard to criticize individuals for trying to keep their academic jobs and enjoy the fruits of having a publication record; yet, the pressure for rapid-fire publications can have negative effects on connecting theory to research by using more time-consuming research protocols.
Most macro-level sociological theories require historical data. Micro theories are more likely to be tested by experimental designs or by various forms of ethnographic research. While these methods are employed by sociologists, often with very interesting results, they are not the dominant methods of the field. The result is that much, if not most, research in the discipline has very little relevance for even the more clearly articulated theories in the discipline.
Another problem in current research practices is, as I emphasized earlier, that theorists must often be researchers, and vice versa. Researchers often feel compelled to generalize and make their work seem relevant to some theory, in a sort of “pretendtheory” manner. Yet, even more insidious is the requirement that theorists also be researchers. Some of the best theorizing in terms of precision comes from theoreticalresearch problems; there can be no doubt about this. Yet, as I emphasized earlier, there are problems. As double agents, theorists will have to keep in mind how they will operationalize and test their theories, with the result that they will typically couch the theory in terms of specific variables that, again, often chop up reality.
Another consequence of the above is that survey research measures variables, not whole persons, social structures, or cultural systems. It slices and dices reality into variables that can be correlated with each other; while it is important to measure the variable (or changing properties) of the social universe, variable analysis chops up reality in ways that are not amenable to theory testing. As noted above, the measure of social structure is self-reported on a questionnaire that uses an SES index; the measure of behavior is often what people say they do; the measure of cultural beliefs are a few items on a scale that has been factor analyzed (only aggravating the problem of chopping up reality in the interests of data collection). I am not saying that surveys are useless in theory-testing, because a theory may include cognitive dynamics that can be conveniently measured by a well-thought-out questionnaire. The end result is that it cannot test social processes and dynamics outlined in a theory.
Survey research is performed because it is comparatively cheap (especially in the time needed to conduct the research), and it can lead to quick publications that are essential to success in an academic career. With the advent of statistical packages and the ability to run these on data sets on personal computers, this kind of research is made even easier. It is hard to criticize individuals for trying to keep their academic jobs and enjoy the fruits of having a publication record; yet, the pressure for rapid-fire publications can have negative effects on connecting theory to research by using more time-consuming research protocols.
Most macro-level sociological theories require historical data. Micro theories are more likely to be tested by experimental designs or by various forms of ethnographic research. While these methods are employed by sociologists, often with very interesting results, they are not the dominant methods of the field. The result is that much, if not most, research in the discipline has very little relevance for even the more clearly articulated theories in the discipline.

Sociology Test – Code Snmptn 167

Sociology Test – Code Snmptn 169

Sociology Test – Code Snmptn 267

Sociology Test – Code Snmptn 269

Sociology Test – Code Snmptn 367

Sociology Test – Code Snmptn 369

Another problem in current research practices is, as I emphasized earlier, that theorists must often be researchers, and vice versa. Researchers often feel compelled to generalize and make their work seem relevant to some theory, in a sort of “pretendtheory” manner. As double agents, theorists will have to keep in mind how they will operationalize and test their theories, with the result that they will typically couch the theory in terms of specific variables that, again, often chop up reality.
As a consequence, theorists-who-must-be-researchers will not theorize beyond a specific process – whether this is exchange, expectations states, role identities, or some other measurable phenomena – and see the bigger picture. Moreover, theories of expectations states splinter the person into an actor who has expectations states over status (in task groups) and who responds to these expectations states. But actors are more than expectation-state machines; they are human beings who reveal other behavioral capacities, many of which have an influence on expectations states and vice versa. True, no theory can explain everything, and it is often useful to test a very specific set of processes. Still, when theorists must be researchers, they will often lose sight of the robust nature of human beings, interaction processes, social structures, and cultural symbols. The result is that even the most clearly stated theories tested in sophisticated experimental settings capture only a small and disconnected piece of reality; what makes matters worse is that people working in a narrow theory-research tradition rarely look over the fence to see what others doing related work have discovered. Fellow researchers will read and evaluate articles for publication, without questioning the assumptions of the theory being tested and without addressing nagging concerns about how to connect the theory and research findings to other theories or how to develop more robust and general theories.
Yet another problem is the unfortunate association of quantitative methodologies with “real” science. The nature of the phenomena oudined in a theory should determine the best methods for assessing the plausibility of the theory; and in my view, observational, historical, and experimental methods are superior to survey research in testing theories. On the other side of this coin, formalization of theories for formalizations sake does not improve upon a bad or narrow theory. How a theory is expressed is a matter of preference; the key requirement of good theorizing is that its concepts denote generic phenomena in the social universe and use these concepts to explain the operate dynamics of generic phenomena. The underlying issue for all of the above problems is the failure to institutionalize the division of labor between research and theory. Theorists should not be encumbered by the need to conduct research, but by the nature of the phenomena examined in their theories. They should be free to move beyond a research tradition and to integrate ideas from other theoretical perspectives. Researchers should be just that, researchers, who choose the methodology to fit the theoretical problem or, if no theorytesting is involved, to fit the descriptive goals of the research problem. Moreover, theorists must state their theories in a manner that allows for operationalization, while researchers must find ways to operationalize the forces (note, not variables) specified in the theory. It is better to have theorists and researchers be different sets of people because theorizing involves pulling away from data, moving up the ladder of abstraction and formulating laws about generic social processes in their most robust forms, whereas researchers must have the capacity to immerse themselves in a specific research setting and discover how empirical events can be seen as manifestations of more general social processes and forces conceptualized by theorists. More importantly, by making this demand that researchers be theorists and theorists be researchers, theories become too narrow and disconnected from each other, while research often becomes an exercise in pretend theory testing.
Ironically, institutionalizing the division of labor between theorists and researchers operates to bring theorists out of the philosophical clouds, to limit the substitution of political ideologies for explanations (in the guise of various “critical” theories), and to make research oriented to theories. A normative climate in which theorists try to keep their personal/ideological biases at bay and to articulate theories that, in principle, are testable works to keep theorists from wandering into the ontological clouds or descending the slippery slope of ideologically driven advocacy. Conversely, the normative requirement to operationalize theories, as opposed to merely mentioning theories in the introduction and conclusions of basically descriptive articles, will lead researchers to use the full set of methodological tools available to test theories. Out of this division of labor will come cumulative knowledge.
On the research side, careerism, ideological ferment, and overtraining students in survey methods (and statistical packages) work against theoretically oriented research. If theory is a mix of critical ideologies, polemical epistemological critiques, and meta-theorizing, why would anyone pay much attention to sociology? Why would clients seek our knowledge? Why would sociology be relevant – beyond ideological ferment – to the real problems of the social universe that affect real people? Similarly, if research findings are, in essence, correlations among variables that have severed the connectivity of the social universe, why would it be very useful beyond simply recording what people say they think, believe, and do? Thus, without the institutionalization of the division of labor between theory and research, sociological practice is greatly limited.
No science can grow and develop, much less have any influence in the real world of policy, if it does not integrate the differentiation between theory and research. We need theorizing connected to research – not by forcing theorists to be researchers and researchers to be theorists – but by institutionalizing the division of labor and the integration of these very different modes of intellectual labor. Calls for public sociology cannot get us out of this dilemma. As I have emphasized, public sociology is, in reality, a radical sociological agenda in professional and scientific clothing (Turner 2006); and it will turn those off whom we must most influence.
This makes sociology more public, to be sure, but does it really draw upon the potential power of sociological analysis guided by theory? Rather than become publicity hounds, which would encourage ideological pronouncements, we sociologists need to “earn our keep” by helping clients with real problems. This is work done behind the scenes, but it can be cumulative in that the more sociology is used to address the problems of clients, the more credibility sociology gains. It is hooking up scientific sociology with practice that, in the long run, strengthens the discipline.
WHAT CAN A CUMULATIVE SCIENCE BRING TO SOCIOLOGICAL PRACTICE?
There are several models of how sociological practice should occur (Fein 2001): (1) moral/normative model (exhortation and sanctions); (2) clinical/educational (see ignorance and educate); (3) cultural/structural model (see players as pushed by external forces); (4) consultant model where specialized expertise is needed and solicited. I am proposing a fifth model: the engineering model, whereby general theories are translated into rules of thumb about basic social processes and then applied by the practitioner to meet a client’s needs. In this model, I reject the moral/normative model, while subsuming the other three models to a sociological practice that has an engineering mentality. Thus, the engineering model that I propose puts theoretical teeth into the other models, while channeling intuition and experience of the practitioner in ways that bring general theories to the specific problems requiring an engineering solutions.
Let us first get out of the way the notion that engineering, and especially social engineering, is bad. Engineering is both inductive and deductive, but the goal is to apply general principles to concrete problems and, in the process, build something, fix something, tear something down, and rebuild something. Social engineering would have the same goals and would revolve around: (1) sets of highly abstract theoretical principles, (2) tests suggesting that these principles are correct; (3) accumulated experiences with these principles in concrete applications; and (4) translations of these principles into rules of thumb that practitioners can draw upon. When these four activities are institutionalized and integrated, social engineering can be more effective.
My goal, then, is to develop a series of rules of thumb that are derived from general theoretical principles that can be used by practitioners – whichever way they play their roles.
What do I mean by “principles” and “rules of thumb”? Theories should be about generic social forces and processes that operate when humans behave, interact, and organize; since these principles explain the operation of universal social processes, some of them will always be relevant to any social setting. In the ideal world, I would visualize graduate programs in sociological practice where these principles would be learned and where they could be referenced in manuals of theoretical principles. I hope some day, if I live long enough, to write Principles for Sociological Practice.